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ABSTRACT 
The article presents an original needs-based partial theory of human injustice and shows 
its relationship to existing theories of human need and human liberation. The theory is 
based on an original typology of three social structural sources of human injustice, a 
partial theorization of the mechanisms of human injustice, and a needs-based theorization 
of the nature of human injustice, as experienced by individuals. The article makes a 
sociological contribution to normative social theory by clarifying the relationship of 
human injustice to human needs, human rights, and human liberation. The theory 
contends that human injustice is produced when oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, 
and exploitation create systematic inequality in opportunities to address human needs, 
leading to wrongful need deprivation and the resulting serious harm. In one longer 
sentence, this needs-based party theory of the sources, mechanisms, and nature of human 
injustice contends that three distinct social systemic sources—oppression, mechanistic 
dehumanization, and exploitation—produce unique and/or overlapping social 
mechanisms, which create systematic inequality in opportunities to address universal 
human needs in culturally 
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specific ways, thus producing the nature of the human injustice theorized here: 
wrongfully unmet needs and serious harm. 
PERSONAL REFLEXIVE STATEMENT 
I have devoted my life to understanding and changing the world around me, while trying 
to be of some help along the way. I have done this as a social activist since entering the 
University of Michigan in 1966; as a social worker since earning two degrees in New 
York City in the 1970s; as a sociologist since entering Michigan’s doctoral program in 
social work and sociology in 1991; and as a social work educator since 2003. For 
changing the world, my primary activism has involved alternative journalism; Chile 
solidarity; peace and nuclear disarmament; radicals in the professions work; consistent 
membership on the organized left; trade unionism (work for five union-based programs, 
organizing a social agency, and election to two faculty union positions); and work on 
affirmative action, police/community relations and campus/community bias incidents. 
For understanding the world, other than my dissertation on the social system of real 
property, I have worked since 1991 in two areas: theories of oppression, dehumanization, 
and exploitation and theories of human need. This needs-based theory of human injustice 
integrates these two areas of previous work and seeks to improve my ability to theorize 
about, engage with, and change the world around me. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article presents a needs-based partial theory of human justice, focused on 
three levels of analysis. First, at the macro social system level, I have created a typology 
of three systemic sources of human injustice: oppression, exploitation, and mechanistic 
dehumanization. Second, at the level of social mechanisms, I supply a partial 
theorization of how these three unjust social systems produce systematic inequality in 
the opportunities people and communities must have to obtain culturally specific 
satisfiers of universal human needs. Third, at the individual level, I provide a needs-
based theorization of the nature of human injustice as individually experienced, with a 
focus on wrongfully unmet needs and how they can lead to serious harm.  
To state the theory in one sentence: This needs-based theory of the systemic 
sources, social mechanisms, and nature of human injustice contends that three distinct 
social systemic sources—oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation—
produce unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms which create systematic 
inequality in opportunities to address universal human needs in culturally specific ways, 
leading to the nature of the human injustice theorized here: wrongfully unmet needs and 
the resulting serious harm. 
Levels of Analysis and Preliminary Definitions  
Starting at the level of analysis of social systemic sources of human injustice, 
oppression in its many forms is conceptualized as a social group-based phenomenon that 
is distinct from exploitation (Cudd 2006). I define exploitation in a way that is applicable 
across economic systems, with the commonality being unequal advantages exercised 
within the context of structured economic exchanges. For instance, Hahnel (2006) 
contended that unjust outcomes are produced by transactions between parties who have 
unequal access to capital, which for the present purposes is broadly conceived to consider 
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a wide variety of forms of capital, such as finance capital, social capital, cultural capital, 
and so forth. 
At a similar social structural level of analysis, the third social systemic source of 
human injustice is mechanistic dehumanization (Bauman 2000, Haslam 2013, 
Kronfeldner 2016, Ritzer 2019). The typology presented in the third section of this paper 
sees mechanistic dehumanization as conceptually distinct from oppression and 
exploitation. Mechanistic dehumanization is the systemic subjection of human beings to 
standardized impersonal processes that ignore our fundamentally human characteristics 
and treat us as nonhuman and/or nonliving objects of manipulation and control (Haslam 
2006). Mechanistic dehumanization involves a range of specific mechanisms, such as 
objectification, desensitization, denial of our need to connect with the natural 
environment, and so forth. It also involves other aspects of the dehumanizing 
consequences of the human creation of Weber’s shell as hard as steel—a new translation 
of the iron cage (Baehr 2001, Merton 1936, Weber, Baehr and Wells 2002)—and of what 
Marx referred to as “the objective transformation of the activity of man and of its results 
into an independent force, dominating him and inimical to him” (1981:176). 
Moving to the level of analysis of social mechanisms, unique and overlapping 
social mechanisms associated with each of the three unjust social mechanisms produce 
systematic inequality in the opportunities people and communities must have to access 
culturally specific need satisfiers of universal human needs. These include satisfiers of 
the intermediate needs discussed in the literature review below—from food and water to 
significant primary relationships and safe birth control and child bearing—that human 
beings must have access to if we are to meet our basic human needs for health and 
autonomy and our basic psychological needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence. 
These universal needs are spelled out by two well-established and compatible 
theories: a philosophically constructed theory of human need (Doyal and Gough 1991; 
Gough 2017) and a post-Maslowian humanistic psychological theory: self-determination 
theory (Deci and Ryan 1980, Ryan and Deci 2017). Figure 1 illustrates the compatibility 
of these two theories, which this paper refers to as THN (theory of human need) and 
SDT (self-determination theory). Such abbreviations are commonly adopted (Deci and 
Ryan 2000, Dover 2016c, Gough 2015). 
Human universal goals of social participation, eudaimonic well-being, and 
avoidance of serious harm cannot be realized without achieving an optimum level of 
human and psychological need satisfaction. Accordingly, at the individual level, I define 
the nature of human injustice as a state of wrongfully unmet human needs. Absent social 
or individual intervention, this produces significantly impaired social participation and 
serious harm. 
Presentation as a Partial Theory 
By design, this is a partial theory. I focus only on human injustice as defined here, 
not on social injustice more broadly. For example, I do not include individual failures to 
prevent injustice (Shklar 1990). This partial theory cannot specify the myriad unique 
and/or simultaneously operating social sub-mechanisms which are part and parcel of the 
central mechanism outlined in the theory sentence, namely systematic inequality in 
4 
opportunities to address universal human needs in culturally specific ways. Also, some 
components of the theory are based upon stated assumptions stemming from existing 
theories of human need. McCarthy and Zald (1977) referred to their work on resource 
mobilization as a partial theory for similar reasons. Likewise, Maslow referred to the 
theory of human motivation as a partial theory (1948). This should not hold back the 
process of theory construction. After all, Hedström and Swedberg (1998) suggested the 
value of a preliminary account of how relevant social mechanisms work.  
Organization of this paper  
This paper has several sections: (1) this introduction; (2) a literature review, 
which outlines the current nature of theory of human need and its relevance for 
sociology, including an explanation of Figure 1, columns 2 and 3 on human need and 
human liberation, respectively; (3) presentation of a typology of exploitation, oppression, 
and mechanistic dehumanization; (4) explanation of each component of the above theory 
sentence, preceded by an explanation of column 1 of Figure 1 on human injustice, and (5) 
conclusions regarding implications of this theory for social theory, social research, and 
social activism. 
Relevance to Humanistic Sociology 
The specific type of normative social theory to which this article contributes is 
needs-based social theory (Brock 2009, Floyd 2011, Noonan 2006a, Noonan 2006b, 
Reader and Brock 2004, Reader 2006, Reader 2011). Others have contended that a 
theory of social justice requires a concept of human need (Brock 1996, Wiggins 1998). I 
use such a needs-based approach to present a three-part continuum from human injustice, 
to basic human need satisfaction to human liberation. 
This three-element discursive alternative to the more abstract distinction between 
social injustice and social justice is amenable to empirical research, since the degree of 
human need satisfaction is an objective and observable aspect of the human condition. 
This theory and continuum can contribute to a post-Cold War moral system that 
addresses human need, human vulnerability, and human interdependence (Friesen 2014). 
Such a system should enforce human rights and make sustainable human need 
satisfaction our global social justice goal (Brock 2011, Brock 2018, Friesen 2014, Gough 
2017, Miller 2012b).  
True, theory alone will not do the trick, without popular struggles, social 
movement building and the challenging of basic cultural—and, I would contend, 
theoretical—precepts (Dolgon 2018). If a new post-Cold War social contract is to be 
achieved, we must theorize and struggle on behalf of human needs and the needs of all 
sentient beings in the Anthropocene (Gabardi 2017). We must engage in theoretical and 
social criticism of abnormal and unnecessary social suffering (Renault 2017). I present 
this theory in that spirit and from the below standpoint. 
Author Standpoint  
This work grew out of two separate lines of inquiry over the last 25 years. At the 
macro level, one concerned theory of human need and its implications for social theory 
and social policy. At the micro level, the other began with classroom exercises about the 
experience of the moment of oppression.  
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With respect to theory of human need, in the debates among progressive activists 
after the fall of what Kennedy (1991) called communist-governed forms of state 
socialism, I opposed taking a defeatist position towards addressing human needs (Dover 
1992, Dover 1993a). I published a book review (Dover 1993b) of Doyal and Gough’s 
(1991) A Theory of Human Need. That book won the Deutscher Memorial Prize and the 
Gunnar Myrdal Prize in 1992. I advocated for the first-time inclusion of the concept of 
human need in the social work Code of Ethics (National Association of Social Workers 
1996). I contended that “knowledge of theories of human need and social justice” be 
required for social work education’s accreditation standards (Council on Social Work 
Education 2015). I also contributed to the first two entries on human need in the 
Encyclopedia of Social Work (Dover and Joseph 2008, Dover 2016c). I later applied 
theory of need to a public sociology that called for a needs-based progressive pragmatist 
approach to key social policy issues, such as school funding and youth unemployment 
(Dover 2014. February 9, Dover 2017, August 20). 
The second line of inquiry began with classroom oppression-awareness exercises 
at several universities, beginning in 1990. This led to publication of a compendium of 
words and affective phrases describing the feelings and emotions experienced at the 
moment of acts of oppression, dehumanization and exploitation (Dover 2008). That 
typology was strengthened by the study of organizational, institutional and class analysis, 
for a preliminary examination in sociology (Dover 1996).  
Formal theory construction began when I realized the relationship of the two lines 
of work. This took place following conference presentations on both topics (Dover 
2009a, Dover 2009b, Dover 2009c) and completion of a retrospective analysis of the craft 
of theorizing used in my dissertation (Dover 2003, Dover 2010b). 
Craft of Theorizing Used  
 Swedberg’s work on the craft of theorizing influenced theory construction (2010, 
2012, 2014a, 2014b). First, I asked what Kimeldorf (1998) referred to as an originating 
question: “What are the social structural causes of social injustice?” I then posed what 
Kimeldorf called a specifying question: “Is it possible that oppression, mechanistic 
dehumanization and exploitation are the three sources of social injustice?” This was 
followed by what Tilly (1990) referred to as subsidiary questions, for example: How are 
these three social systems related to each other? Is there a fourth such system? How 
might their social mechanisms produce unmet need? What is the nature of wrongfully 
unmet need? The present theory responds to such questions.  
As part of the craft of theorizing, I used class theory, defined as theory developed 
in the classroom. This included guessing—in class—the second and third elements of the 
typology of unjust social systems: exploitation and dehumanization. First a student in our 
oppression exercise said they had never experienced oppression, and therefore could not 
take part in the exercise. I asked, have you ever had a lousy minimum wage job? The 
student said yes and was able to talk about unjust moments from that experience of 
exploitation. After a couple of years, a student contended that they never been oppressed 
or exploited. I asked: has a bureaucracy ever treated you like a number? The student 
answered yes and gave an example. Ensuring discussion added dehumanization to the 
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typology of systems that can produce powerful moments of the experience of injustice. 
The nature of the exercise and the resulting compendium was later published (Dover 
2008). At this example shows, guessing and class discussion are part of the craft of 
theorizing (Peirce 1929, cited in Swedberg (2014a)). 
Other craft elements employed included reducing the theory to one sentence; 
parsing the sentence into its component parts; presenting the theory via explanation of 
each of the parts of that sentence, and—after returning from the aforementioned 
conference at the University of Bath in 2009—waking up one morning having dreamed 
column 1 of Figure 1. According to Swedberg (2014a), dreams can help fuel the 
sociological imagination which is exercised in the craft of theorizing. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: HUMAN NEED AND HUMANISTIC SOCIOLOGY 
This section discusses the importance of theory of human need, discusses some of 
its key conceptual problems, presents a synthesis of the key concepts of THN and SDT, 
and explains columns 2 and 3 of Figure 1. 
Importance of Theory of Human Need for Humanistic Sociology 
Despite considerable sociological attention to human rights in recent years (Cole 
2012, Sklair 2009, Somers and Roberts 2008), Wolbring, Keuschnigg and Negele (2013) 
pointed out there has been little formal theoretical attention to human need in sociology. 
This is despite Sayer’s recognition (1997, 2011) that an objectivist foundation to human 
well-being is implicit in classical and recent social theory.  
Early on, Lynd stressed the importance of asking questions that have “relevance 
to persisting human need” (1939:226). Etzioni (1968) contended that improvements in 
human needs theory might correct for Wrong’s (1961) concern about oversocialized 
conceptions of humankind. Lenski (2005) suggested moving beyond Maslow to develop 
modern theories of human similarities and differences. Estes (2008), contended that 
human needs are objective, universal, and transcultural, and endorsed Doyal and Gough’s 
(1991) theory of human need (1991). 
More recently, Friesen (2014) suggested that societal moral systems, codified as 
human rights, are an example of the conceptual evolution of humanity. Friesen (2014:21) 
further proposed to “move the dialogue from a descriptive analysis of what a society is to 
what it should be” and to develop “a theory of society based on democratic human need 
fulfillment.” Furthermore, Sayer (2007:241) called for a “needs-based conception of 
social being,” which recognizes that people are “…capable of flourishing or suffering.”  
However, despite explicit calls for humanistic sociology to attend to questions of 
human need (DuBois and Wright 2002, Goodwin 2003, Parsons 1971), no previous article 
in this journal has utilized formal theory of human need nor presented a needs-based 
theory of injustice. With one notable exception (House and Mortimer 1990), the 
sociological literature has not responded to Etzioni’s emphasis on the contradiction 
between social structures which produce false needs and the role of human autonomy in 
addressing true needs (Etzioni 1996). 
This has been the case for several reasons. First, McCarthyism had a deleterious 
influence on American intellectual life (Dover 2016c). For example, during the McCarthy 
period, the plates of the book Common Human Needs were destroyed by the federal 
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government, following Congressional criticism of its prescriptions for human well-being 
(Posner 1995, Towle 1944, Towle 1945). Second, Gough (2017:39-41) stressed the role 
of four competing theories: preference satisfaction theory; happiness and subjective well-
being theory; relational well-being theory and its roots in cultural relativism; and the 
human capabilities approach. Third, what McCumber (2016) called the triumph of Cold 
War philosophy de-emphasized normative concerns and stressed positivist epistemology. 
In other words (Antonio 1981:331), “Western social science, based on the Kantian 
division of fact and value, is supposed to describe ‘what is’ without making value 
judgements.”   
Fourth, Cold War ideological conflict stunted full recognition of the centrality of 
human needs and human rights. By the 1970s, Moyn (2018) has noted, Cold War 
assumptions had undermined the 1940s era recognition that civil and political rights were 
fundamentally linked with economic and social rights. As the end of the Cold War 
approached, Moyn (2018:212) saw an increased “visibility of human rights ideals,” 
accompanied by a declining emphasis on national social welfare commitments. Seen 
retrospectively, many of the civil rights and social welfare policy advances during the 
Cold War were achieved due both to mass mobilizations and to corporate liberal elite 
consent motivated by the value of such policies in the Cold War ideological struggle 
(Dover 1998, Dudziak 2000). Following the Cold War, the earlier reliance on advocacy 
for human rights as a “morally pure form of activism” (Moyn 2018:212) became 
ascendant.  
This led to the widespread post-Cold War use of human rights discourse to 
advance social justice causes, but also to a reduction in the extent of explicit human needs 
advocacy, which Moyn (2018) noted had been widely employed as part of the basic 
needs approach to social development in the 1970s. Following the Cold War, 
postmodernist and poststructuralist thinking recognized that human needs might be 
universal from a theoretical standpoint, but also contended they were ultimately 
“historical, normative, and political in nature” (Hamilton 2013:56). Human rights were 
increasingly seen as universal, while human needs were seen as socially constructed, 
culturally relative, and rooted in Eurocentric master narratives (Ife 2001, Ife 2007, Jani 
and Reisch 2011).  
This was despite some recognition that the opposite is true: Human rights are 
universal only to the extent that they are adopted and enforced, but human needs are 
rooted in the human condition. For instance, Wronka recognized (2017:Preface): 
“Technically, human rights do not exist. However, human needs do, and human rights 
make up the legal mandate to fulfill human need.” Optimally, human needs, human rights 
and social justice should be discussed with reference to each other, rather than singly. A 
typology of human injustice, human need, and human liberation can inform a needs-
based approach to such a discourse. 
There is now promise for sociology to return its attention to normative social 
science (Gorski 2016, Prasad 2016, Steward 2016) and to evolve a critical social science 
which would “explicitly and systematically analyze and critique the relationship between 
normative and descriptive claims” (Gorski 2017:442). Social scientists have recently been 
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encouraged to listen to our “cousins in moral and political philosophy” (Gorski 
2013:553). Sayer (2009:782) said that normative approaches should include “…some 
conception of well-being and ill-being.”  
Such theory can address fundamental sociological concerns. For instance, take the 
question of inequality or social stratification. Dean and Platt (2016:343) pointed out that 
Sen (1992) asked an important question: Inequality of what? Sen’s focus and that of 
Nussbaum (2011) have been on inequality of capabilities. I stress inequality of 
opportunities to address needs. The advantages of needs theory are shown in a chapter 
which favorably compared needs theory to capabilities theory (Gough 2014), published in 
a book edited by Comim and Nussbaum (2014).  
Likewise, Rawls (1971:36) asked an important question about social structure: 
What does a just social structure look like? Finally, Emmanuel Renault (2017:175) asked, 
“But what kind of standard can we appeal to when we demand that social suffering be 
one of the topics of public discussion and political confrontation?” The present paper 
suggests three related questions: (1) What does an unjust structure of society look like? 
The typology of oppression, mechanistic dehumanization and exploitation includes three 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for human injustice. (2) What does a partial 
account of its social mechanisms suggest? This paper suggests that the overriding social 
mechanism is the creation of systematic inequality of opportunities to access need 
satisfiers. (3) How can we conceptualize the nature of the human injustice produced? 
This paper suggests that wrongfully unmet needs, if not addressed, produce serious harm 
and significantly impaired social participation. 
Theory of Human Need: Literature Reviews 
First, I will briefly discuss several overviews of needs theory. Dean (2010) 
discussed theories of need within the context of social policy and social theory. Dean 
analyzed Marx’s account of human need, as have others at book length (Fraser 1998, 
Heller 1976, Soper 1981, Springborg 1981). Dean also distinguished between humanistic, 
economistic, paternalistic and moralistic accounts of needs, and stressed the centrality of 
needs concepts for understanding forms of social exclusion. The present paper stresses 
inequality of opportunities to address needs as example of social exclusion. 
A recent volume on sustainable social development (Holden, Linnerud and 
Banister 2017) included accounts of the capability theory of Sen (2009) and Nussbaum 
(2000), Max-Neef’s (1992) account of human scale development, Rawl’s (1999) concept 
of primary goods, and Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs. The authors compared the 
theories of Doyal and Gough and of Max-Neef, and showed they both viewed human 
needs as universal and objective, although satisfied in culturally specific manners. Like 
Gough (2017), both theories stress the importance of need theory in planning for the 
sustainability of human need satisfaction for future generations. 
Brock (2018:1) began by noting the many ways of “interpreting the advice to 
distribute ‘to each according to his needs.’” Brock’s reference is of course to the phrase 
“from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs” (Marx 1978:531). 
Brock reviewed classical and modern philosophical treatment of the concept of human 
need. For instance, Brock (2018:14) described the contention of Frankfurt (1998) that 
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there are “two necessary conditions for a need’s deserving moral importance: a need is 
morally important if harm typically results when the need is not met and that harm is 
outside the person’s voluntary control.” Brock also explained the view of Wiggins 
(1998[1987]) regarding the moral importance of the serious harm which can arise when 
factors beyond a person’s control prevent vital needs that are entrenched—inflexible and 
not substitutable—from being met. 
Brock (2018:15) pointed out that Doyal and Gough (1991) theorized human need 
satisfaction as requiring “universalizable preconditions that enable non-impaired 
participation…” Earlier, Brock’s Global Justice: A Cosmopolitican Account (2009) 
pointed out that Doyal and Gough stressed the importance of social (not just physical) 
functioning, as well as the value of cross-cultural comparison of how people function 
individually and in social groups to address their morally important needs. 
A book-length summary of SDT and related research is now available (Ryan and 
Deci 2017), as is a chapter-length restatement of THN, in a monograph applying needs 
theory to global climate change (Gough 2017). The present author has also published two 
annotated bibliographies (Dover 2010a, Dover 2016b) and two encyclopedic overviews 
of human need theory (Dover and Joseph 2008, Dover 2016c).  
Theory of Human Need: Conceptual Issues 
Nevertheless, there have been a number of conceptual problems that should be 
discussed here (Laudan 1977, Tucker 1994). The first concerns the importance of 
distinguishing between needs and wants. This distinction was addressed in the first 
presentation of THN (Doyal and Gough 1984, Doyal and Gough 1986). In the Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, Gough (2015) later showed that the emphasis of economic theory 
on wants (preferences) over needs has produced social policies that neither advance 
human well-being nor address how climate change threatens basic need satisfaction for 
future generations. Other reasons for distinguishing between needs and wants have also 
been discussed (Frankfurt 1998, Gasper 2004, Gough and Thomas 1994, Macpherson 
1977, Miller 2012a, Noonan 2006b). 
 Another conceptual problem is whether to confine contemporary needs theory to 
theories of basic survival needs. Theory of human need has been concerned with the thin 
needs associated with basic need satisfaction and the thick needs associated with human 
flourishing (Dean 2010, Dean 2013, Fraser 1989b, Taylor 2011). As recently noted 
(Noonan 2014), the concept of human need can be used for a contemporary critique of 
capitalism and for understanding the requirements of human flourishing. 
 Also, how should we understand the question of serious harm? Lack of access to 
needs satisfiers, unless addressed by social interventions, will produce serious harm 
(Provence and Lipton 1963, Waldfogel 2006). Rawl's (1971) original position, which 
proposed a veil of ignorance about the nature of the rights required for the avoidance of 
harm, was used by Doyal and Gough (1991) to theorize the nature of basic human needs. 
Wiggins (1998[1987]) concluded that it is possible to identify objective, 
noncircumstantial conditions which are necessary in order to avoid serious harm. Sarah 
Clark Miller (2012b) discussed Doyal and Gough’s (1991) use of the centrality of serious 
harm and indicated their approaches were not contrary to the more developed account of 
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serious harm. However, not all serious harm is a result of human injustice. As Mikkola 
noted (2016:151): “Not all harms that we suffer are wrongs.” This theory only concerns 
serious harm that is resultant from wrongfully unmet needs stemming from the structures 
and mechanisms of human injustice. 
The most vexing conceptual problem has concerned whether human needs are 
universal or culturally specific. This is not a simple question, but the study of human 
universals is an important question for anthropology and other disciplines (Brown 1991, 
Brown 2004). Proponents of human universals may face criticism they are “imposing 
some kind of repressive universalism” (Sayer 2009: 776), or are advocating for a 
dictatorship over needs (Fehér, Heller and Márkus 1983). Gough (1994), however, 
convincingly dismissed concern that the proper application of needs theory would 
involve any kind of paternalistic dictatorship over needs, an issue also discussed by 
Reader and Brock (2004).  
Both THN and SDT theorize that human needs are universal but addressed in 
culturally specific manners. As for the contention that universal needs can be identified, 
Noonan (2012) distinguished between objective organic life requirements and more 
comprehensive conceptualizations of need, and made the convincing claim that both can 
be defended as universal. Dean (2010) argued that universal conceptions of need are 
required in order to explain our relational selves and our need to meaningfully participate 
in human society. Ife (2013) recognized that grassroots discourse rooted in the assertion 
of universal human rights and informed by the universal human need theory of Doyal and 
Gough (1991) can contribute to struggles against neoliberal globalization.  
Accordingly, a theoretical assumption made by this theory of human injustice is— 
as Doyal and Gough (1991:28) contended—human needs “are the same now as they will 
be in the future—everywhere and for everyone.” As Maya Angelou put it (1994), “I note 
the obvious differences, between each sort and type, but we are more alike, my friends, 
than we are unalike. We are more alike, my friends, than we are unalike.”  
Theory of Human Need (THN) and Self-Determination Theory (SDT) 
According to a theory of human need (Doyal and Gough 1991) and to self-
determination theory (Ryan and Deci 2017), the individual human need of all human 
beings is to achieve an optimum level of health and an optimum exercise of autonomy of 
agency. Autonomy, as broadly defined in THN, requires satisfying the psychological 
needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness theorized by SDT. Minimally optimal 
satisfaction of health and autonomy needs (THN) and satisfied basic psychological needs 
(SDT) are necessary to (1) achieve an implicit universal goal of survival and avoidance of 
serious harm, and (2) achieve explicit universal goals of engaging in minimally impaired 
social participation (THN) and eudaimonic well-being (SDT).  
According to these theories, there is no hierarchy between physical and 
psychological needs. Both are essential for achieving universal human goals related to 
participation and well-being. However, human liberation demands other societal 
preconditions, such as enhanced levels of critical autonomy and self-determined 
behavior. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the above synthesis of THN and SDT, in columns 2 and 3. Ian 
Gough, co-author of THN, and Richard Ryan, co-author of SDT, have confirmed the 
accuracy of the juxtapositions of their theories presented in columns 2 and 3 of Figure 1 
(private communications, 2016 and 2018). Columns 2 and 3 portray the structure of THN 
in a way that is theoretically identical to earlier work (Doyal and Gough 1991:170, Figure 
8.2, used with permission). We will begin with the bottom of the chart, at the social 
system level, and move up to the sociocultural and individual level requirements and 
characteristics of basic human need satisfaction and human liberation. 
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<FIGURE 1: Theories of Human Injustice, Human Need, and Human Liberation> 
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Figure 1 and the above several paragraphs are the first effort to graphically 
portray and conceptually combine the relationship of THN and SDT. The above 
paragraph draws entirely on earlier formulations of THN and SDT, except for the 
distinction between implicit and explicit goals. Needs theory rests on the implicit 
theoretical assumption that avoidance of serious harm is a universally desirable outcome, 
irrespective of anomalous observations to the contrary, such as those mortals who seek to 
defy the concept of cumulative risk (Laudan 1994, Laudan 1997). But there are also 
explicit universal goals related to social participation which are characteristic of human 
beings. Both the implicit and explicit aspects of the universalizable goals defined by THN 
and SDT are inextricably bound up with each other, as part of the avoidance of serious 
harm and the pursuit of human liberation. 
In the bottom box of column 2 of Figure 1, at the social system level, THN posits 
four universal societal preconditions for achieving basic needs: systems of production, 
reproduction, cultural transmission, and political authority. SDT stresses how proximal 
social contexts and pervasive social, economic, and political influences are the 
foundation for the culturally specific mix of satisfiers of basic needs. For SDT, these 
differentiate between need supportive (or less supportive) environments. For THN, 
theoretical and empirical support exists for a variety of specific intermediate needs. 
Optimally meeting basic human and psychological needs is not possible without a 
minimally optimal level of intermediate need satisfaction. 
The bottom of column 3 outlines THN’s preconditions for optimization of need 
satisfaction and for human liberation. This includes a set of human rights with some 
mechanism for enforcement. There I have placed the phrase universal human rights in 
parentheses, because that term was not in the original THN theory chart. That chart 
referred to a set of negative and positive rights (Doyal and Gough 1991:170). In a minor 
semantic revision to the original theory, Gough (2017) recently referred to negative and 
positive rights as freedoms from and freedoms to, respectively. These include political 
participation and other political rights, as well as civil rights and a guarantee of the right 
to needs satisfiers. 
Theoretically, these rights outlined in column 3 are preconditions for human 
liberation. As outlined in column 2, a more limited set of universal preconditions allow 
meeting basic human needs. The present theory builds on columns 2 and 3 by suggesting 
that unjust social systems can produce systematic inequality in access to satisfiers of 
intermediate needs. This reinforces the centrality of the human rights outlined in column 
3, since systems of human rights can constrain contemporaneously co-existing systems of 
human injustice. 
Notably, according to THN, as we move up from the bottom of column 3, human 
liberation requires cross-cultural education, broadly conceived to mean not only formal 
education but the entire range of what sociologists used to refer to as race and culture 
contacts (Frazier 1957). Clearly, to achieve critical participation in one’s chosen form of 
life (human liberation as theorized by THN, see column 1 at top), one must have 
knowledge of alternative ways of life. Additionally, human liberation demands a higher 
14 
level of autonomy—critical autonomy, according to THN—as well as enhanced human 
capacity, such as a higher level of competence, relatedness, and autonomy, according to 
SDT. 
A TYPOLOGY OF THREE SOURCES OF HUMAN INJUSTICE 
Social theory aimed at understanding more than one unjust social system—and 
what it is about each system that contributes to injustice—has a long pedigree. Marx 
famously asserted (1967[1867]:Vol. 1, 301), “Labour cannot emancipate itself in the 
white skin where in the black it is branded.” Capitalism and Slavery (Williams 1944) and 
Caste, Class, & Race: A Study in Social Dynamics (Cox 1948) discussed the respective 
roles of exploitation and oppression in human slavery. Debate continues today about the 
relative roles of two systems—capitalism and racism/racial formations—in enforcing 
social inequality (Bonilla-Silva 2014, Coates 2011, Omi and Winant 2015).  
Such work begged two important counterfactual questions. First, would ending 
one unjust social system be possible without ending the other? Second, would ending one 
system accelerate the unjust role of the other? Such questions fueled the dual systems 
theory debate (Sargent 1981), which concerned the respective roles of class exploitation 
and oppression—especially patriarchy—in producing injustice (Fraser 1989b, Young 
1981, Young 1990, Young 1997). The present typology differentiates not two but three 
social systemic sources of human injustice: exploitation, oppression, and mechanistic 
dehumanization.  
Theoretical Assumptions 
This typology agrees that the sources of injustice are neither unitary nor fully 
mutually exclusive in operation (Collins 2015, Collins and Bilge 2016). However, at the 
social system level of analysis, this theory sees them as conceptually distinct sources of 
human injustice. At the level of analysis of social mechanisms, this theory sees them as 
working in various combinations and instances, both jointly and singly, to produce 
systematic inequality. 
I have theorized human injustice at three levels, using the same concept: human 
injustice. It is not tautological to define the nature of human injustice as a product of the 
sources and mechanisms of human injustice. This is because the causal path from unjust 
social structures to wrongfully unmet individual needs involves distinct levels of analysis. 
This is a theory of human injustice at the individual level and of its social structural 
sources. 
This typology also makes assumptions about relevant change agent questions. For 
instance, who, in any society, is at the helm of the systems of production, reproduction, 
cultural transmission, and political authority theorized by THN to be universal 
preconditions? Who sets up and enforces the systems of human rights needed for human 
liberation? Who controls systems of oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and 
exploitation? Such moments of the agential exercise of power represent an undetermined 
combination of heteronomy and autonomy: they are both constrained and self-
determined. 
At this stage of theory articulation, this partial theory cannot narrate such 
moments of the exercise of power or name specific human agents. However, consistent 
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with the weakly version of the microfoundations thesis (Little 1991), this can conceivably 
be done with further research. In one step towards this, I discuss further below the role of 
change agents in primary, secondary and tertiary prevention of human injustice. 
That theorization of prevention shows this is not a deterministic theory. A 
deterministic theory posits that given a certain condition, a particular outcome will 
always be observed (Friesen 2014). The present theory sees the three unjust social 
systems as necessary conditions, not as sufficient conditions. Figure 1 illustrates a causal 
path from the societal to the mechanistic to the individual levels of human injustice. This 
theory contends this happens when there no successful social interventions to disrupt that 
process. 
In other words, the theorized causal path does not predetermine a particular 
outcome, at any level. People, communities, and entire societies may exercise their 
autonomy by enforcing human rights at each stage of the production of human injustice. 
In this sense, there are both vertical and horizontal elements of the theory. There is 
tension between unjust social systems in column 1 and the human rights in column 3. 
Universal human rights can laterally influence the extent to which culturally specific 
satisfiers of intermediate needs (THN) have enabled creation of a needs-supportive 
environment (SDT). 
For instance, please see the arrow from preconditions for optimisation at the 
bottom of column 3 to specific satisfiers in column 2, and from box B in column 1 of 
Figure 1 to the same specific satisfiers. In other words, within any culturally specific 
historical conjuncture, there are struggles and debates over needs (Fraser 1989a, Fraser 
1989b). Such struggles can defend our ability to achieve the minimally optimal level of 
intermediate human need satisfaction shown in column 2, mobilize against the human 
injustice illustrated in column 1, and strive for the human liberation outlined in column 3.  
Human injustice, even with the continued existence of systems of oppression, 
mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation, is not inevitable. We are capable of 
undergoing what is known as a moral paradigmatic shift (Friesen 2014), which would 
enable us to influence the nature of the moral system under which we live and to defy the 
seemingly deterministic outcomes of a particular material infrastructure, the control of 
which can be contested. As Reynolds noted (1963:186), “oppression produces the 
resistance which will in the end overthrow it.” 
Exploitation 
This theory needs a conceptualization of exploitation that is applicable across 
economic systems. This typology draws on the work of Hahnel (2006) and Tilly (1998). 
Like Cudd’s (2006) theory of oppression, they are applicable universally across different 
economic systems. Hahnel (2006) contended that exploitation involves transactions 
between unequal parties that produce unjust outcomes. Hahnel (2006) noted that 
employment under capitalism leads to alienation and injustice. However, Hahnel also 
pointed out that in any hypothetical economy characterized by capital and labor markets, 
even free economic exchanges can worsen injustice, given unequal advantages to those 
with a capital advantage. The implication of that theory is that exploitation is not 
necessarily directly coercive.  
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This dovetails with the observation of Cudd (2006) that exploitation is not 
inherently coercive. In most historical instances, it may very well have been. But from a 
theoretical perspective, it need not be. Nevertheless, small disadvantages, even in free 
exchanges, are significant. They can become cumulative in their impact (Blau and 
Duncan 1967, DuBois 1973). Hahnel recognized that unjust outcomes can take place in 
any economy where markets in labor, commodities or credit exist. Those with less capital 
in an economic exchange experience disadvantage, and this can lead to unjust outcomes. 
Tilly (1998) developed a theory of inequality that posited mechanisms of group 
domination as well as economic extraction. For Tilly, powerful, connected people and 
organizations engage in exploitation by deploying resources from which they draw 
significantly increased returns. They coordinate the efforts of outsiders, whom they 
exclude from the full value added by those efforts. Exploitation involves the coordinated 
efforts of power holders, who deploy and command resources to control the returns from 
those resources, engage in categorical exclusion, and skew the distribution of returns in a 
way not consistent with effort. As with Hahnel’s theory, Tilly’s work helps explain how 
exploitation can produce systematic inequality across economic systems. 
Taken together, as applied and adapted here, these two approaches to 
understanding exploitation enable us to understand exploitation in a way that is 
conceptually distinct from the theories of oppression and mechanistic dehumanization 
used in this typology. Furthermore, this approach to exploitation is applicable across 
various economic systems and historical periods. 
Oppression 
In a book-length univocal philosophical theory of oppression, Cudd (2006) 
addressed the risk of reducing all forms of oppression to a single type of oppression. 
Another well-known risk is violating the principle of not constructing hierarchies of 
oppression (Collins 1993). Accordingly, the present theory does not privilege oppression, 
mechanistic dehumanization, or mechanistic exploitation. Also, this article does not try to 
distinguish among or discuss the various forms of oppression themselves (ableism, 
ageism, heterosexism, racism, sexism, to acknowledge just a few alphabetically). Nor 
does it imply these three sources of human injustice cannot work jointly at the level of 
specific social mechanisms or social formations. For instance, exploitation combined 
with oppression produces super-exploitation (Nielsen and Ware 1997, Omi and Winant 
1994). 
Cudd (2006) cited other theories of oppression (Harvey 1999, Wertheimer 1987, 
Young 1990) and discussed theories that directly informed the model (Clatterbaugh 1996, 
Frye 1983). These included one that suggested the value of relying on the concept of 
social group as a core element of the theory (Gilbert 1989). Cudd identified four 
necessary and sufficient conditions for social group oppression: (1) a harm condition 
linked to identifiable institutionalized practices; (2) institutionally and perpetually applied 
harm to a social group that exists independently of the presence of the harm condition; 
(3) a privilege condition requiring the existence of a social group which benefits from the 
identified institutional practice; and (4) a coercion condition involving demonstrated use 
of coercion as part of the identified harm. 
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Cudd discussed direct and indirect forms of both material and psychological 
oppression. Cudd devoted an extensive philosophical analysis to determining that 
coercion is not an inherent element of exploitation and workplace participation under 
either capitalism or socialism. On this basis, Cudd distinguished oppression from class 
exploitation, and in doing so supplied an important foundation for the present typology.  
Cudd’s (2006) conceptualization of degradation and humiliation was compatible 
with the social group-based theory of animalistic dehumanization of Haslam (2006, 
2014).  
Mechanistic Dehumanization 
Haslam (2006) defined animalistic dehumanization as taking place when one 
social group persistently treats another social group as not having the same uniquely 
human attributes. However, Haslam’s theorization of mechanistic dehumanization was 
not social group-based. Just as Cudd’s (2006) distinction between oppression and 
exploitation identified the first two legs of the stool of this theory, Haslam’s (2006) and 
Kronfelder’s (2016) approaches to dehumanization support the third leg. 
Haslam delineated two types of dehumanization, one of which (mechanistic 
dehumanization) is here deemed conceptually distinct from both oppression and 
exploitation (Haslam 2006, Haslam and Loughnan 2014). Whereas animalistic 
dehumanization and oppression treat distinct social groups as subhuman, mechanistic 
dehumanization involves the treatment of others as nonhuman or even as nonliving, and 
as not having the core features of human nature. 
However, caution must go with the use of the phrase human nature. Kronfeldner 
stressed (2018:2): “As a vernacular concept, talk about ‘human nature’ leads to ethically 
unjustified dehumanization of people that are considered as being not fully human…” 
According to Haslam (2006), mechanistic dehumanization involved viewing groups or 
individuals as automata. For Haslam, mechanistic dehumanization can exist independent 
of two aspects of social-group-based oppression: the implicit disdain of one social group 
for another and the explicit engagement in social-group-based conflict.  
The empirical extent to which mechanistic dehumanization is not a feature of 
intergroup relations is an empirical question. Haslam’s (2006) social psychological 
account was partially rooted in accounts of noninstitutionalized interpersonal relations. 
Since those relations may not be systematic, that part of Haslam’s theory is not relevant 
to the present theory. Only institutionalized expressions of mechanistic dehumanization 
are part of this typology. 
As used here, mechanistic dehumanization need not be rooted in any particular 
social group status on the part of either those exercising or receiving the dehumanizing 
practices involved. Mechanistic dehumanization involves the application to people of 
processes of “standardization, instrumental efficiency, impersonal technique, causal 
determinism, and enforced passivity” (Haslam 2006:260). For Haslam (2006:262) 
mechanistic dehumanization “involves the objectifying denial of essentially human 
attributes to people toward whom the person feels psychologically distant and socially 
unrelated.”  
18 
Haslam and Loughnan (2014:401) made clear that the process of dehumanization 
is both a “striking violation of our belief in a common humanity” and an abandonment of 
our “enlightenment assumption that we are all essentially one and the same.” Haslam 
(2006) used a trichotomy of humans, animals, and machines to show how 
dehumanization implicitly and explicitly undermines our human essence. Thus, for 
Haslam dehumanization was both a process and an outcome.  
 Freire (1970), however, saw dehumanization only as a by-product of oppression, 
which was seen as more fundamental. Treating dehumanization as an outcome of 
oppression—as was also done by Mikkola (2016)—stresses the dehumanized nature of 
the person who has experienced injustice. Mikkola’s (2016) thick conceptualization of 
dehumanization does not undermine the present theorization of human injustice. Seeing 
people who have experienced injustice as dehumanized is a powerful recognition, 
because it cries out for rehumanization (Rediehs 2014). But it is important to recognize 
that there is a systemic process of mechanistic dehumanization, oppression, and 
exploitation that produce that dehumanized state. This theory of human injustice suggests 
that the nature of human injustice is a state of wrongfully unmet needs that without 
intervention will produce serious harm and significantly impaired social participation. 
As used here, mechanistic dehumanization is a social system of theoretical 
importance. Kronfeldner (2016) drew on Haslam’s theory of dehumanization and its 
distinction between mechanistic dehumanization (treating people as nonhuman or as non-
living) and animalistic dehumanization (treating social groups as less than human). 
Kronfeldner (2016:4) showed how dehumanization classifies people in inclusive or 
exclusive ways with respect to various views of human nature, including being fully 
human or being “‘not human’ or ‘less human.’”  
Kronfeldner (2016:3) said that dehumanization involved three things: implicit 
processes such as the holding of beliefs towards an out-group; a resulting prejudice 
towards the out-group; and a set of explicit behavioral consequences at the individual, 
organizational and societal levels. Kronfeldner’s theory incorporated group-based theory 
of oppression into the theorization of dehumanization. In that respect, it was not 
conceptually distinct from oppression for the purposes of this typology. However, 
Haslam’s (2006) recognition that dehumanization produces injustice is consistent with 
this theory of human injustice. 
Continued progress in the theorization of dehumanization is underway (Bain, Vaes 
and Leyens 2013). This will further identify specific mechanisms, including a spectrum 
of objectification (Rector 2014). Work has already been done on desensitization, namely 
our progressively less sensitive emotional response to the pain and suffering of others 
(Grossman 2009, Grossman and DeGaetano 2014). Dehumanization may also involve 
denaturization—the systematic and enforced separation of humanity from the natural 
environment. 
Already, Szasz (1970) has shown how medicalization, criminalization and other 
dehumanizing approaches to social problems are used by the therapeutic state (Gambrill 
2014). Patients as well as workers are dehumanized within some human service 
organizations (Rader 2008). Montagu and Matson (1983) connected dehumanization to 
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large-scale social processes such as industrialization, compulsive obedience, mechanized 
behavior, and the effects of the scientific revolution. For one historical example relevant 
to mechanistic dehumanization, Kühl (2016) examined the organizational imperatives of 
supervisors within German organizations that carried out the holocaust.  
In another example, Ritzer (2019:6) noted that so irrational is the supposedly 
rationalized nature of McDonaldization, that it produces inefficiency in the name of 
efficiency, a feigned friendliness that ultimately represents falsity in human relations, 
pervasive disenchantment, and risks to the human need for a safe and healthy work and 
physical environment. This dehumanizes both workers and customers. According to 
Dolgon (2018:58), Ritzer’s theory demonstrated how the irrational nature of what 
appears to be rationality ends up denying our basic humanity. 
Bauman discussed how dehumanizing organizational processes were 
characteristic of the holocaust, Hiroshima and the gulag, and are still relevant today 
(1991:144): “The organization’s answer to the autonomy of moral behaviour is the 
heteronomy of instrumental and procedural rationalities,” with heteronomy seen as an 
individual level state devoid of moral autonomy. In such a diminished agentic state 
(Bauman 1991:162), “…the actor is fully tuned to the situation as defined and monitored 
by the superior authority…” 
In Modernity and the Holocaust, Bauman further specified (2000:103): 
“Dehumanization is inextricably related to the most essential, rationalizing tendency of 
modern bureaucracy.” From soldiers to corporate officials to human service personnel, 
Bauman (2000) suggested that bureaucratic goals and their attendant routines produce an 
ethical indifference to the moral demands of human beings. Dehumanization treats 
human as objects devoid of any claim to justice. The systematic study of mechanistic 
dehumanization can contribute to our epistemological effort at denaturalization—the 
process of recognizing that the world is not the way it is because it is natural for it to be 
this way. This can lead to an antinecessitarian critique of society (Unger 1987), by which 
is meant understanding what Bauman called (2000 [1990]) “the gap between the 
necessary and the real.” 
A full historical account or the presentation of detailed examples is beyond the 
scope of this article. But there is reason to believe that mechanistic dehumanization has 
long been a characteristic feature of developed civilizations. Seen dialectically, just as 
modern technologies such as the computer and the machine have had both liberating and 
dehumanizing characteristics, the abacus served the pharaohs well. The branding and 
tattooing of slaves has been well established in antiquity, and has been traced to the 
origin of the concept of stigma (Jones 1987). More recently, according to Herf (1984), 
modern technological dehumanization has produced both reactionary critiques—
including those used to justify totalitarian dictatorship under the Nazi regime—and 
Marxist analysis, such as the view of Bukharin that technology can become an 
autonomous social force (Lukács 1972). 
Summary 
 Before going ahead, I must ask: Is there a fourth such system? Over nearly a 
decade of careful consideration and extensive consultation, I have been unable to identify 
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a fourth systemic source of human injustice that meets three requirements: (1) it is 
conceptualized at a similar level of abstraction, (2) it is not significantly similar to 
oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, or exploitation, and (3) it is not merely a social 
mechanism stemming from these three social systems. Systematic poverty (Bak and 
Larsen 2015) does not qualify, since being in poverty is one case of wrongfully unmet 
needs. One such candidate—social inequality—is a social process that stems from human 
injustice, not a fourth unjust social system. 
A NEEDS-BASED PARTIAL THEORY OF HUMAN INJUSTICE 
In this section, I parse the theory sentence into numbered parts. Following an 
explanation of column 1 of Figure 1, I discuss each of the key italicized concepts of the 
theory sentence: 
This (1) needs-based theory of the systemic sources, social mechanisms, and 
nature of (2) human injustice contends that (3) three distinct social systemic 
sources––oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation––produce (4) 
unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms, which (5) create systematic 
inequality in opportunities to address (6) universal human needs in culturally 
specific ways, leading to (7) the nature of the human injustice theorized here: (8) 
wrongfully unmet needs and the (9) resulting serious harm.  
Explanation of Column 1 of Figure 1  
Figure 1 illustrates the needs-based theory of human injustice and a typology of 
human injustice, basic human need satisfaction, and human liberation. Column 1 has four 
sections: (A) the sources of social injustice, (B) the mechanisms of human injustice, (C) 
the first part of the nature of human injustice, a state of resultant wrongfully unmet needs, 
and (D) the other aspect of the nature of human injustice: serious harm and significantly 
impaired social participation. 
Box A illustrates the existence of one or more necessary (but not sufficient) 
conditions for human injustice, namely a system of oppression, exploitation, or 
mechanistic dehumanization. Box B of column 1 shows how oppression, mechanistic 
dehumanization and exploitation can singly or jointly produce systematic inequality in 
opportunities to access culturally specific need satisfiers due to unique and/or 
overlapping social mechanisms of one or more of these unjust social systems. Box C 
illustrates how a combination of the direct effects of systematically unequal opportunities 
and the effect of that inequality on the adequacy of intermediate need satisfaction can 
produce a state of wrongfully unmet need.  
To constitute human injustice, wrongfully unmet needs (column 1, box C) must 
be resultant from the sources and mechanisms of human injustice. Only then are they 
wrongfully unmet needs, as opposed to needs which are unmet for any number of 
reasons. Determining which specific mix of levels of various intermediate need 
satisfaction and which specific degree of systematic inequality of access to the available 
need satisfiers produce what specific degree of wrongfully unmet needs is an empirical 
question, not a theoretical question. Also, as discussed in more detail below, preventive 
social interventions, rooted in human rights enforcement, can prevent the advent of 
wrongfully unmet needs, meet them once unmet, or reverse their harmful effect. 
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Deci and Ryan (2002) theorized that when basic psychological needs for 
autonomy, competency, and relatedness are not met, there is not only psychological harm 
such as anxiety and depression, but heightened morbidity and mortality (Williams 2002). 
Ryan and Deci (2017) recently concluded that a critical question for psychology is what 
set of internal or external conditions allow human flourishing and prevent serious harm, 
such as ill health and failure to thrive. Doyal and Gough (1991) said suboptimal levels of 
physical health and/or suboptimal levels of autonomy of agency produce unmet need. 
SDT stressed unmet psychological needs. The concept of role stress (Doyal and Gough 
1991) is consistent with lack of autonomy and is an element of wrongfully unmet need. 
At the individual level of analysis, further portrayed in box D, such a state leads 
to a strong likelihood of serious harm. Doyal and Gough (1991) saw unmet need as 
leading to mental illness, cognitive deprivation, and role stress, all of which can impair 
participation. This is consistent with the role of restricted opportunities in directly 
producing restricted participation (Doyal and Gough 1991:171-87). Fraser (2009) has also 
stressed that institutionalized barriers to participation are central to injustice. As 
illustrated in box D, column 1, human injustice involves significantly impaired social 
participation, as opposed to minimally impaired social participation, which column 2 
shows is enabled by basic needs satisfaction.  
In the next section, I explain the sources of human injustice, the mechanisms of 
human injustice, and the nature of human injustice. Subsections 1-3 concern the sources 
of human injustice; 4-7 the mechanisms of human injustice; and 8-9 the nature of human 
injustice. The numbers and italicized words are from the parsed theory sentence 
introduced earlier and are part of the craft of theorizing employed here.  
The Sources of Human Injustice 
 (1) Needs-based theory: Giving primacy of place to human needs is important for 
understanding human injustice. Doyal and Gough (1991) and others have recognized that 
theories of social justice need more than an implicit conception of human need; they 
require a clear theory of need (Reader 2005, Wiggins 1998, Wiggins 1998[1987], Wiggins 
2005). O’Neill’s (1998) deontological needs-based approach—which explored the 
relationship between human needs and human rights—also suggested the value of 
considering human moral obligations to meet the needs of others. Reader and Brock 
(2004:263) concluded that “needs must be central” and called for a needs-based 
approach. Noonan (2006a) also contended that needs-based concepts are central to moral 
philosophy and ethics and to a needs-based reconceptualization of democracy.  
Reader (2007) later developed a needs-based theory of ethical practice, which was 
designed to normatively inform social policies directed to the reality that humans are 
vulnerable beings who universally experience states of unmet (occurrent) need. Reader 
(2007) reasoned that such states should respond to the moral demand to address those 
needs which are dispositional (unavoidable, essential), given our status as human and 
living beings who strive to both avoid harm and to flourish. In a final publication, Reader 
(2011:594) contended, “We developed the concept of need… to distinguish within our 
communities the demanding from the undemanding, the serious from the less serious, the 
necessary from the unnecessary.” 
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 Brock (2009) developed a needs-based cosmopolitan theory of global social 
justice, using modified Rawlsian thought experiment methods—supported by empirical 
results from experimental psychology—to arrive at an understanding of the preferred and 
compromise forms of consensus concerning a range of social interventions, which were 
seen as ensuring the minimum tolerable set of income and other social protections and 
entitlements. Brock (2013) later clarified the logical structure of coherent statements of 
need. These included an agent, an end-state goal, and instrumental requirements. Brock 
concluded that fundamental human existence needs have a normative force which 
justifies placing defensible claims on others. The present article conceptualizes injustice 
in a way which gives a stronger moral and political force to objections to wrongfully 
unmet needs. 
(2) Human injustice: Using a needs-based approach to human injustice enhances 
the theory’s normative significance and differentiates the theory within the larger body of 
theory of social injustice. This article is the first formal theoretical use of the concept 
human injustice. Shklar (1990) used the concept once, without defining it in relation to 
injustice generally. Brooks (1999) used the concept to attribute to human beings a litany 
of examples of injustice, seen in terms of violations of human rights. The concept has 
also been employed in work on human environmental domination of nature (Wenz 1996).  
No earlier theory has bridged human injustice, human need, human rights, and 
human liberation. However, previous theory has differentiated human needs, human 
rights, and human liberation (Dean 2015, Doyal and Gough 1991, Gil 2004, Ife 2013, 
Noonan 2006a, Young 1990), human needs and social injustice (Dorling 2010, Gil 1998b, 
Seidler 1986, Shklar 1990), and human needs and inequality (Temkin 1993, Tilly 1998).  
 (3) three distinct social systemic sources: This discussion is brief, given the 
typology presented above. Since this is not a deterministic theory, the social forces 
produced by the social systems of human injustice do not function in isolation from the 
existing universal preconditions outlined in column 2 or the systems of human rights 
outlined in column 3. There is, in a sense, a competitive relationship between unjust 
social systems that constrain opportunities for need satisfaction and systems of human 
rights that enable such opportunities. To believe otherwise would not only be 
deterministic but would be defeatist. And the people united will never be defeated 
(Rzewski 1990 [1975]).  
The Mechanisms of Human Injustice 
(4) Unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms: Elster (2007) noted that in 
order to explain social behavior in nondeterministic ways, we rely upon the explication of 
plausible social mechanisms. By a social mechanism, Elster (2007) meant a demonstrable 
causal chain of sorts, at a lower level of abstraction than a general law. Hedström and 
Swedberg (1998) and Stinchcombe (1991) discussed the value of posing an abstract 
higher-level theory, in this case a typology of social systems, and then identifying 
associated social mechanisms and tracing their impact on more observable outcome 
phenomena, in this case systematic inequality and unmet needs experienced by individual 
human beings. Progress in social science, Hedström and Swedberg (1998) contended, 
often involves such efforts to identify mechanisms (M) which generate an outcome (O). 
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In this theory, M consists of the unique and overlapping (but only partially theorized) 
mechanisms, while O stands for the systematic inequality in opportunities discussed next.  
(5) Systematic inequality in opportunities: Doyal and Gough (1991) stressed that 
what is central for needs theory is inequality of opportunity to address human need, not 
the mere existence of unequal or suboptimal levels of human need satisfaction. The 
present theory emphasizes that unequal outcomes in levels of need satisfaction are not 
necessarily unjust, absent systematically unequal opportunities. Mere inequality in access 
to opportunities to address needs is not necessarily unjust either. Only systematically 
generated inequality—rooted in one of the three theorized unjust social systems—leads to 
human injustice as defined here. 
 Doyal and Gough (1991:171) posited a direct role for restricted opportunities, 
independent of lack of autonomy of agency, in producing unmet need. Logically, such 
unjust barriers may prevent the exercise of autonomy. Doyal and Gough (1991) parsed 
restricted opportunities into role deprivation and role stress. Role deprivation is relevant 
to systematic inequality of opportunity. Role stress is relevant to the state of wrongfully 
unmet need discussed further below.  
(6) Universal human needs in culturally specific ways: THN and SDT both view 
human needs as universal, but as met in culturally specific manners. Ryan and Sapp 
(2007) noted that both theories posit an objective basis for needs, and that those needs are 
universal across cultures, although addressed differently. Maslow (1943) long ago 
recognized that human needs are both universal and addressed in culturally specific ways. 
As Sayer (1997) has noted, the concern should not be whether theories of sameness 
should be attempted, but whether they are well reasoned and can be empirically 
supported. This theory of human injustice contends that we must engage in systematic 
analysis of within-social-group and between-social-group similarities and differences 
about the sources, mechanisms, and nature of human injustice.  
The Nature of Human Injustice 
(7) Nature of human injustice: Human injustice involves a state of wrongfully 
unmet need that leads to serious harm and significantly impaired social participation. 
This individual level of human injustice must be resultant from the role of oppression, 
mechanistic injustice, and exploitation in producing systematic inequality of 
opportunities to address human needs, and not from non-systemic acts of individual 
injustice. The theory’s needs-based character distinguishes it from other theories of social 
injustice. Other theories have also contended that denial of access to the means to satisfy 
human need is at the core of injustice (Gil 1998a, Gil 2004, Noonan 2006a, Olson 2007), 
but this has not been formally theorized. The following sections on wrongfully unmet 
needs and serious harm further discuss two aspects of the nature of human injustice. 
(8) Wrongfully unmet needs: Wrongfully unmet human needs at the individual 
level are a key element of the nature of human injustice. The three systemic sources of 
human injustice are unjust, according to my typology. Wrongfully unmet needs are 
wrongful because they result from the sources and mechanisms of human injustice as 
theorized, and for no other reason relevant to this theory. More substantively, however, 
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they are wrongfully unmet because they are unmet due to systematically unequal 
opportunities for need-satisfaction (Noonan 2004, Noonan 2006a, Noonan 2006b).  
The resulting need deprivation is therefore wrongful. Support for such an 
approach to wrongfully unmet needs can be found in the work of Shklar (1990), who was 
concerned that the use of theories of distributive justice often resulted in lack of 
specificity about what was distributed and how that was or was not wrongful. Similarly, 
Temkin (1993) saw inequality as a subset of the more general topics of justice and 
fairness, and viewed injustice as more than naturally or randomly occurring unfairness. In 
such a case, the unmet needs would be wrongfully unmet. Wiggins (1998[1987]) 
explained that the avoidance of serious harm requires certain identifiable necessary 
conditions which are not circumstantial. This would not include need deprivation which 
takes place due to nonsystemic unfair acts, natural disasters, or other reasons which are 
not inherently unjust (Shklar 1990). Noonan (2004, 2006a, 2006b) contended that social 
theory has underemphasized need deprivation. The present theory concurs, and states that 
wrongfully unmet needs are one aspect of the nature of human injustice.  
(9) Serious harm: Without preventive action being taken, need deprivation 
produces serious harm (Doyal and Gough 1991, Noonan 2012, Thomson 2005, Wiggins 
1998[1987]). It is theoretically valuable to link wrongfully unmet human need to serious 
harm. Sarah Clark Miller (Miller 2012b) stressed the centrality of serious harm. Wiggins 
(1998[1987]:43) reasoned it this way: a need is something that one absolutely must have 
instrumental access to in order to avoid being harmed, and therefore “it is pro tanto unjust 
if, among vital interests actually affected by such [social] interventions, the greater 
strictly vital need of anyone is sacrificed in the name of the lesser interests of however 
many others.” Likewise, McMurtry (1998) criticized classical and contemporary 
economics and proposed a concept of need associated with the deprivation of conditions 
that reduce human organic capability. For McMurtry (1998:164), “N is a need if and only 
if, and to the extent that, deprivation of N always leads to a reduction of organic 
capability,” by which was meant “the agent's organic abilities to move, think and feel.”  
CONCLUSIONS 
This theory of human injustice has implications for social theory, social research, 
and social activism.  
Implications for Social Theory 
The most importance implication of this theory is to recognize the moral and 
political responsibility to end the sources of human injustice and to prevent the 
progression of its harmful effects. Short of ending oppression, exploitation and 
mechanistic dehumanization, which would by the tenets of this theory end human 
injustice, prevention of the effects of injustice can still take place. However, prevention 
of the effects of human injustice would not end human injustice, for reasons I explain 
next. In doing so, I draw on a new vocabulary of prevention which visualized primary 
prevention as upstream, secondary prevention as midstream, and tertiary prevention as 
downstream (Gough 2013).  
Even if efforts to enforce human rights and other forms of “upstream” primary 
prevention efforts have prevented oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and 
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exploitation from producing systemic inequality in opportunities to address human need, 
human injustice would still exist. Even if “midstream” (secondary prevention) efforts 
have compensated for wrongfully unmet needs and prevented serious harm, human 
injustice would exist. Even if “downstream” (tertiary prevention) efforts have reversed 
the impact of serious harm and restored at least minimally impaired social participation, 
human injustice would still exist. Understanding these three key intervention points for 
preventing the progression of human injustice is important theoretically, empirically, and 
politically. But so is understanding that even the best designed system of prevention at 
various levels would not mean there was no human injustice.  
This is because until humankind has achieved human liberation, human injustice 
will exist. It is important to understand that even if some combination of preventive 
social policies and collective resistance have succeeded in guaranteeing basic human 
need satisfaction, this does not ensure human liberation. Human liberation requires what 
the theory of human need refers to as “critical autonomy” (Doyal and Gough 1991) and 
what self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2002: 20) refers to as “self-determined 
behavior.”  
This would hardly be a normative and humanistic theory of human injustice if 
there was not a vision for human liberation. Whether it would be possible to achieve 
human liberation without ending all forms of oppression, exploitation and mechanistic 
dehumanization is a counterfactual of the future which this theory cannot address. 
Whether some degree of human liberation could exist following a combination of 
preventive social interventions and robust human rights enforcement—despite the 
continued existence of one or more social systems of injustice—is an empirical question. 
This theory is valuable due how it enables asking such questions. In doing so, this theory 
contributes to normative social theory and to sociological theory.  
Implications for Social Research 
Empirical research based on this theory might ask several questions. At the 
individual level—and among individuals, groups, communities, and social groups—how 
is human injustice experienced? Is it experienced via everyday acts of oppression, 
mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation, such as microaggressions and 
macroaggressions (Dover 2016a)? How systematically unequal are opportunities to 
access satisfiers of human need? What is the mix of various kinds of wrongfully unmet 
needs? What is the specific nature of the serious harm? 
This theory provides a framework for addressing important social questions with 
research implications. For instance, can humanity survive and flourish in a sustainable 
manner (O'Neill et al. 2017)? If so, what kinds of social structure can address human 
needs in a manner sustainable across generations, given global climate change (Gough 
2015, Gough 2017)? These are not new questions. 
Here, a competing theses approach is valuable (Platt 1964). On the one hand, 
Gough (2000) earlier expressed hope that well-designed welfare states might conceivably 
address basic human needs within the context of a well-regulated contemporary 
capitalism. On the other hand, Robert Lynd (1939:220) suggested that capitalism 
“probably cannot be made to operate, to assure the amounts of general welfare to which 
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the present stage of our technological skills and intelligence entitle us.” Noonan (2006a) 
concluded that an expansively considered state of human need satisfaction cannot be met 
without fundamentally challenging property rights. Katz-Fishman, Scott and Destine 
(2016) contended that given projections for a growing population of dispossessed 
people—a new precariate class excluded by job-eliminating technologies from the means 
to meet human needs—not only short-term demands on the state but fundamentally 
revolutionary change will be required in order to address human need. Efforts to 
determine the preponderance of evidence for these competing theses must “resist the 
premature closing-off of the world from further practical action or reflection” and 
entertain theories that are contrary to orthodoxy (Harvey 1990:5). 
There is also a need for class, organizational, and institutional analyses of the 
nature of mechanistic dehumanization at the systemic, mechanistic, and individual levels. 
Can class analysis show how “machinery put to wrong use” can transform people into “a 
part of a detail machine” (Marx 1967[1867]:Vol. 1, 422)? Does the statement, “The 
instrument of labor strikes down the labourer,” require further empirical examination 
(Marx 1967[1867]:Vol. 1, 432)? Can organizational analysis of our society of large 
organizations (Perrow 2002) shed light on possibly unanticipated and dehumanizing 
consequences of bureaucracy and other organizational practices (Baehr 2001, Merton 
1936, Weber, Baehr and Wells 2002)? At the level of social mechanisms, have 
exploitation and oppression not only produced systematic inequality in addressing our 
material needs, but also undermined the intimacy, identity, and dignity needs which 
characterize our species (Paige 1993)? 
Wrongfully unmet needs are an objective consequence of human injustice. This 
demands research over the life course of individuals, within and between social groups, 
across entire populations, and among societies via historical comparative research. 
Similarly, research can study progress towards human liberation by evaluating the extent 
of need satisfaction within and between societies which vary in their social structural 
arrangements. Such research can show the conditions necessary for overcoming barriers 
to human flourishing and liberation. 
Implications for Social Activism 
Just as the dual-systems theory debate involved fundamental questions for a 
praxis that could inform social activism, this theory’s identification of three unjust social 
systems has such implications. Young (1997:8) criticized Fraser for positing the 
“existence of two ‘systems’ of oppression—namely capitalism and patriarchy.” Fraser 
proposed analyses of both the domestic sphere and the state sphere, and suggested both 
have a structural and an interpretive dimension (Fraser 1989b:141-2, fn 34). Fraser 
contended (Fraser 1989b:p. 139, fn. 7), “There are not, in fact, two distinct systems but, 
rather, two thoroughly interfused dimensions of a single social formation.” Fraser 
defended the value for praxis of such an analysis. Young replied that Fraser’s approach 
would hinder “coalitions of resistance to dominant economic and political forces” 
(1997:149). However, according to the ultimate logic of both approaches, although 
multiple sources of injustice might work as a single integrated system, the origins and 
operations of social injustice involve more than one social system of injustice. 
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Collins (Collins 2015:4) recognized that two or more “structural forms of power” 
can coexist, and eschewed single-axis thinking (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall 2013). This 
suggests that there is value for praxis in how the present approach to human injustice has 
distinguished among three systemic sources of human injustice.  
There is historical support for the value of such an approach. As Charno noted in 
Neoliberal Apartheid (Clarno 2017), the leadership of the South African struggle adopted 
a two-stage theory which distinguished between apartheid—a system of oppression as 
theorized here—and capitalism—a system of exploitation. Charno (2017) named “racial 
capitalism” as an analytical perspective which might have informed a strategy to confront 
apartheid and capitalism simultaneously. The tripartite coalition alliance—the African 
National Congress, the South African Communist Party, and the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions—made a strategic decision to focus on ending apartheid and to 
postpone efforts to end capitalist exploitation (Maharaj et al. 2014, O'Malley 2007).  
Influencing this collective decision was theoretical attention to three sources of 
injustice: the oppression which apartheid represented, South African monopoly 
capitalism, and the persistence of both capitalist and socialist economic alienation (Slovo 
1990). Slovo (1990) presented a three-system analysis and a three-stage strategy. First 
there would be a national democratic revolution designed to end apartheid, set up 
electoral democracy and institute constitutionally prescribed human rights. Next, there 
would be a global struggle for democratic socialism that could eventually end economic 
exploitation. Only in a third stage would communism bring with it the elimination of all 
forms of alienation. In South Africa, at an important historical point, a three-system 
analysis of the barriers to human liberation was of tactical and strategic importance to 
struggles against social injustice. 
As we forge a praxis that can inform struggles against social injustice today and 
tomorrow, it is important to recognize that economic exploitation and group-based 
oppression are not the only sources of human injustice. Mechanistic dehumanization is 
also an important source of human injustice, and it can also produce the impetus for 
significant social change. For instance, Ritzer (2019:201) noted that dehumanization can 
produce mass resistance, since “being locked in such a cage is apt to be infuriating to 
most people.” As Paige stressed, (1993:12) injustice related to the denial of basic human 
needs can produce “movements of resistance that can lead to fundamental changes in 
capitalism.” As Renault (2017) has noted, in Spain Podemos has made the political 
critique of social suffering the foundation of its movement. 
Theories of human injustice, human need and human liberation can fuel social 
struggles that are both normatively linked to recognized moral consensus and are 
progressively pragmatic (Unger 2005, Unger 2007, Unger 2009). Furthermore, needs-
based social theory such as this partial theory of human injustice can help “focus 
attention on the vexed dynamics of difference and the solidarities of sameness in the 
context of antidiscrimination and social movement politics” (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall 
2013:788). One example of that was the widespread appearance of the slogan “Human 
Needs, Not Corporate Greed” during the Occupy Movement in the United States in Fall 
2011.  
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Final Conclusions 
This needs-based partial theory of human injustice draws on theories of human 
need that stress both absolute biological (existence) needs, welfare needs (basic needs of 
the kind required for avoidance of serious harm), and those perfectionist needs required 
to flourish (McLeod 2014). I have argued that it is unjust to allow systematic inequality in 
opportunities to address each of these forms of human need: to survive, to avoid serious 
harm, and to flourish. 
People do not live by bread alone. For the human liberation we value, we need to 
be able to dance and to daven, as well as to toil for our daily bread. As Rose 
Schneiderman said in 1912 (Eisenstein 1983:32), “The worker must have bread, but she 
must have roses, too.” Such struggles for human liberation are rooted in our most 
fundamental needs and our fondest desires. Our struggle is to eventually end oppression, 
mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation. In the meantime, to survive, we must 
enforce human rights than can constrain human injustice. But we must never forget our 
goal of human liberation. 
To build such a world demands the elimination of systems of oppression, 
mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation. This needs-based partial theory of human 
injustice contributes to a normative social science about what it is that we are fighting 
against and what it is that we are striving for. It does so by stressing the primacy of needs 
for our analysis of human injustice and for our vision of human liberation. Needs-based 
theory of human injustice can help ensure that we root our theory, research and activism 
in the everyday reality of the human condition. This can help ensure we are not beholden 
to ideologies and theologies that do not prioritize preventing human injustice, meeting 
human needs, and striving for human liberation. 
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